The FBI has a new wiretap wish list that would expand the agency’s ability to monitor online traffic. Unlike similar proposals in the past, this time the FBI is suggesting that consumers be forced to pay for the costs associated with retrofitting existing networks to allow easier access for FBI surveillance.
According to a Washington Post story by Dan Eggen and Jonathan Krim, law enforcement is concerned that voice-over-IP services on the Internet can be used by terrorists and criminals to evade surveillance. So, once again, the FBI’s solution is to paint with as broad a brush as possible, leaving nothing uncovered and without considering wider repercussions in the culture. According to the 83-page petition for expedited rulemaking filed with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the FBI doesn’t want to monitor only your net-based telephone conversations, but instant messaging and web browsing behaviors as well.
The notion of law enforcement forcing the reconfiguration of existing networks isn’t unprecedented. In 1994, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) was enacted that, among other things, required telecommunications providers to rewire their networks for easier wiretapping by governmental surveillance agencies.
One of the provisions of CALEA required the attorney general to accurately publish the maximum wiretap capacity required by law enforcement agencies. In October 1995, the capacity requirements were released, and the FBI claimed it would need wiretaps on approximately 30,000 telephone lines simultaneously. There are about 160 million telephone lines in the United States, and the FBI’s requirements were more than four times the total number of wiretaps executed in 1993, the year before CALEA was enacted.
Shortly after the release of the proposed wiretap capacity requirements, the FBI proposed that cellular carriers implement a standard allowing law enforcement to determine the exact physical location of a subscriber within a half second. The FBI either conveniently forgot or didn’t care that CALEA clearly precludes physical location information:
“... call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber…”
I analyzed the FBI’s consistent efforts to expand its surveillance powers around CALEA in Information Eclipse more than five years ago. This behavior within the law enforcement community continues unabated.
What’s different this time is that the FBI’s latest proposal calls for consumers to cover the costs of their own surveillance.
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